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Articles
TITLE VII AND THE TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
DONALD

F. KIESLING, JR.*

Since 1970, the number of American workers employed as temporary
employees has risen by more than 400%.' More than ninety percent of
American businesses use, or have used, "temps." 2 While temporary employees
offer a company certain advantages,' those employees exist in a kind of limbo
with respect to their employment status.' Because a temporary employee often
works at a site away from his or her actual employer, a serious question exists
as to whether or not the "on-site" employer, that is, the employer who is
purchasing the worker's services from the temporary agency, can be held liable
for violations of a temporary worker's Title VII rights.
Depending upon the situation, a temporary employee could be considered
an employee of his or her temporary agency, an employee of the on-site
employer, or both. Therefore, it is important for on-site employers to know
what actions by them could later lead to liability under Title VII, and what
protections are available. Further, an employer must know how to react if a
temporary employee accuses the on-site employer, or its agents, of a Title VII
violation.

* St. Norbert College, B.A. 1987; University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, M.P.A. 1994;
Marquette University. J.D. 1997. Attorney with the law firm of Godfrey and Kahn, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. I wish to dedicate this article to my wife, Jean, and to my sons, Tom and Will.
Without their support, my legal career would not have been possible. I also wish to thank Professor
Phoebe Weaver Williams from Marquette University Law School for her assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. DAVID NYE, ALTERNATIVE STAFFING STRATEGIES 7 (1988).
2. Id. at 6.
3. For an excellent discussion of the "temp" way of life, see KEVIN D. HENSON, JUST A TEMP
(1996).
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THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

As of 1993, between one and two percent of all American workers worked
as temporary employees. 4 In 1993, about fifteen percent of all new jobs created
were temporary jobs. 5 Typically, these temporary jobs pay less than permanent
jobs and offer fewer benefits to employees. 6
The use of temporary workers benefits the on-site employer in several
ways. First, the company experiences significant cost savings. 7 These savings
are due not only to the fact that temporary employees work for lower wages and
fewer benefits, but also because on-site employers typically invest far less time
and money into training temporary employees. Temporary employees also offer
companies greater flexibility. An employer can hire a temp for just a few days
when a permanent employee is ill, absent, or leaves the company. Additionally,
the temporary arrangement allows the company to terminate the relationship
whenever it sees fit.
The use of temporary employees also allows companies who use temps to
fill vacancies quickly. Rather than placing an advertisement in the newspaper,
interviewing those who respond, and finally hiring a permanent employee, a
company can usually get a temp the next day. Many temporary employees are
seeking permanent work;' while some temps may not be as productive as
permanent workers, a good temporary candidate may be hired by an employer
as a permanent employee. 9
Because temps receive lower pay and fewer benefits, temporary
employment agencies must do something to attract employees. In addition to the
obvious benefit of being able to start work almost immediately, temporary
agencies sell the flexibility of a temporary work assignment to potential workers.

4. Id. at 7.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 5-6.
7. NYE, supra note 1, at 28.
8. According to Henson, 75 to 80% of temporary employees are seeking full-time work.
HENSON, supra note 3, at 32.
9. Some temporary employment agencies attempt to limit an on-site employer's ability to hire
its workers by making the company sign an agreement not to hire temporary workers as permanent
employees for a specific period of time following the end of the employee's temporary assignment.
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Temp agencies often target the recruitment of homemakers, students, recent
graduates, people who are seeking permanent employment, and others who
desire a great amount of flexibility.'"

II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. History
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act" prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' 2 This legislation was a response
to the racial unrest that engulfed the United States in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Following the assassination of President Kennedy, President Johnson
pushed for the passage of federal civil rights legislation. The legislation that
emerged was a compromise between those who proposed more sweeping civil
rights legislation and Southern representatives who favored no federal action.' 3
Title VII has been amended three times. In 1972, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act' 4 was enacted. This amendment expanded the coverage of
Title VII in relation to the employers who are covered by Title VII and clarified
the definition of discrimination on the basis of religion. 5
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court, in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 6 held that pregnancy was not covered under the prohibitions against
sex discrimination included in Title VII. 7 Congress responded by enacting the
Pregnancy Discrimination Amendments of 1978.18 This amendment placed
discrimination due to pregnancy within the purview of Title VII's sex
discrimination prohibitions.

10. HENSON, supra note 3, at 26-47. Whether or not on-site employers allow temps to take
advantage of this flexibility is questionable. Henson asserts that temp agencies may discourage
workers from missing work so that the agency's customer, the on-site employer, is not angered or
inconvenienced.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Title VII also prohibits employers from segregating their workers
based on these classifications. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a).
13.

See generally MACK A. PLAYER Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION LAW 24 (2d ed. 1995). The author also wishes to thank Attorney Patrick 0.
Patterson for imparting his knowledge of Title VII and its history.
14. Id.
15. Id. For a discussion of the EEO Act of 1972, see PLAYER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25.
16. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
17. Id. at 136.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (specifically defining "pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions" as being within the term "because of sex" for Title VII discrimination purposes).
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The 1989 Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio"9
made it easier for an employer to prove that it had a business justification for
discrimination by requiring a plaintiff to show that a particular employment
practice had a disparate impact on his or her protected class. The Civil Rights
Act of 199120 restored the interpretation of Title VII to the status quo as it
existed prior to Wards Cove and several other decisions.2"
B. Theories of Discrimination Under Title VII
There are four separate theories under which a plaintiff can bring a Title
VII discrimination suit. These theories are disparate treatment, adverse impact,
failure to make reasonable accomodation, and retaliation.
1. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment refers to the unlawful practice of treating an employee
differently based on his or her membership in a protected class. 22 Disparate
treatment can be proven by direct evidence,23 circumstantial evidence,2 4 or by
proving a pattern or practice of discrimination on the part of the employer.'
2. Adverse Impact
Adverse impact refers to a practice that, while not facially discriminatory,
has a disparate impact on a particular protected class.26 Adverse impact can
apply to both "objective" measures and "subjective criteria."27

19. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
20. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
21. See generally PLAYER E7 AL., supra note 13, at 25-27.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
23. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
24. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnelDouglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
25. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman
Transport Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). For a review of the EEOC's guidelines for adverse impact analysis, see 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3
(1995).
27. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 989-91 (1988). In Watson, the
subjective measure in question involved input by supervisors who were familiar with all the
candidates for a specific job. Id. at 982. An example of an objective measure would be an aptitude
test.
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3. Failure to Make Reasonable Accomodation
Failure to reasonably accomodate refers to an employer's duty to
Employers
accomodate an "employee's religious observance or practice." 2
are not required to make an accomodation if that accomodation presents undue
hardship .29
4. Retaliation
Employees who participate in the filing of discrimination charges against
an employer are protected from adverse employment action due to their
Title VII also protects employees who suffer adverse
participation.'
employment outcomes due to the employees' opposition to unlawful practices.
C. The Employment Relationship Under Title VII
The terms "employer" and "employee" are vaguely defined in the statutory
language of Title VII. 3' Title VII applies to employers engaged in industry
affecting commerce who employ fifteen or more employees. 2 Employee is
defined as "an individual employed by an employer."" Specific employers,
such as "bona fide" private clubs and Indian tribes, are exempted from Title
VII.M Beyond that, no indication exists 5of how Congress intended to define
the employment relationship in Title VII.
1. Tests for Determining Who Is an Employer
The fact that no statutory language further defines the term "employer" is
particularly troubling when viewed in the context of a temporary employment
relationship. One must look to the courts to provide guidance as to what
constitutes an employment relationship under Title VII.

28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
29. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-74, 84 (1977). In this case, the
Supreme Court defined undue hardship as any cost beyond de minimis. Id. at 84.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a).
See also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN Er AL., EMPLOYMENT
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
DISCRIMINATION 582 (4th ed. 1997).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). Specifically, a "person" who is "engaged in an industry
affecting interstate commerce" must have 15 or more employees for each working day for 20 or
more days in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
35. See generally SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 582.
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a. NLRA Tests
(1) Economic Realities Test
Courts have applied three tests in an attempt to ascertain what does or does
not constitiute an employment relationship. The first test is the "economic
realities" test applied by the D.C. Circuit in Spirides v. Reinhardt.36 Spirides
involved a broadcaster for Voice of Amercia who worked as an independent
contractor. She brought suit under Title VII after she was discharged when the
VOA decided that they no longer needed a "female voice."" Using a test
usually applied to National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 38 cases, the court held
that it was proper to look at the "economic realities" of the employment
relationship, particularly the degree of control exercised by on-site employers.39
The Spirides court set forth eleven factors that a court will consider when
applying the economic realities test:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

the type of occupation;
the skill required;
who furnishes the equipment;
the length of time that an individual has worked;
the method of payment (by time or by job);
the manner in which the relationship is terminated;
the leave given;
is the work an integral part of the business?;
are retirement benfits paid?;
are social security taxes paid?; and
the intent of the parties.'
(2) Union Membership Test

In NLRB v. Western Temporary Services,4 the Seventh Circuit held that
temporary employees were eligible to vote in union elections if their relationship
with the on-site employer met four criteria. These criteria are:

36. 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789
F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983).
37. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 828.
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 160(f) (1994).
39. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 830-32. See also L. Lynne Pullium, Temporary Employees: What
Are an Employer's EEO Responsibilities?, 18 EMP. REL. L.J. 533, 535 (1992).
40. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832.
41. 821 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1987).
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1. the employer requested the employee by name from the temporary agency;
2. a long-term relationship exists between the on-site employer and the
temporary employee;
3. the employee worked at the same facility as the company's permanent
workers; and
4. the potential for permanent employment existed.42
On its face this ruling applies narrowly to union membership for a small
number of temporary employees. However, given the willingness of other
courts to apply NLRA tests to Title VII, it is possible that a court may look at
the union membership test as an alternative to the economic realities test. 3
b. The Magnuson/Amarnare Test
The two most significant cases dealing with the relationship between
temporary employees and on-site employers are Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." and Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services,
Inc. 45 The district court in Magnuson built upon the opinion in Amarnare to
develop a test for determining whether or not an employer is subject to Title VII
liability.
In Amarnare, a temporary employee for a brokerage firm filed suit against
her on-site employer for sexual discrimination. The district court held that the
on-site employer was the plaintiff's employer for the purposes of Title VII. The
court said that the most important factor in determining whether or not a party
is an employer for the purposes of Title VII is the extent of the employer's
"right to control means and manner of individual performance."4 The court
looked to common law principles to guide the analysis as to whether the
relationship met the standard.47

42. Id. at 1266-67, 1269-70.
43. The rationale for choosing the union membership test over the economic realities test would
be two-fold. First, the union membership test is easier to apply and is much less fact intensive.
Second, the union membership test is much more narrow in scope. A court that wished to narrow
the definition of employee for Title VII liability purposes, but did not completely wish to preclude
a temporary employee's ability to recover under Title VII, may find the union membership test a
desirable alternative.
44. 611 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
45. 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992).
46. Amarnare, 611 F. Supp. at 348.
47. The Amarnare court held that the common law principle of a shared servant subjected both
the temporary agency and the on-site employer to Title VII liability. Id. at 349. In its discussion
of the shared servant doctrine, the court cited Maynard v. Kenova Chem. Co., 626 F.2d 359 (4th
Cir. 1980). The Maynardcourt based its shared servant analysis on agency principles. It is unclear
whether or not the Amarnare court meant to base its analysis of the "right to control" on agency
principles. A variation of the shared servant doctrine, the doctrine of joint employment, will be
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The Magnuson court expanded upon the holding in Amarnare by developing
a two-part test for determining whether or not an on-site employer is the legal
employer of a temporary employee. Magnuson was a temporary employee who
was sexually harassed by her on-site supervisor. Magnuson brought an action
against the temporary agency that employed her, the on-site employer, 4 and the
corporation for whom her on-site employer was a dealer, Volkswagen. 1
The Magnuson court first held that the employer must meet the statutory
definition of an employer under Title VII. 49 Second, the court held that the
employer-employee relationship must meet the Amarnare criteria.50 Under the
Magnuson test, both the temporary agency and the dealership were found to be
employers for the purposes of Title VII. The court held that the relationship
between the temp agency and the worker was exactly the relationship
contemplated by the definition of employer in Title VII. 5 The court also
found that, based on the statutory 2 definition of employer, the dealership and
Volkswagen were also employers.1
The court then analyzed the relationships based on the Amarnare criteria.
Again, the court held that, because the relationship between the plaintiff and her
temporary agency was clearly that of employer-employee, no further analysis
was necessary. The court conducted a much more detailed analysis in reviewing
the relationship between the dealership and the temporary worker. The court
held that, because many of the functions of the dealership went to the means of
control and manner of performance, the dealership was an employer for Title
VII purposes.53 The court viewed such things as defining job duties, setting
the work schedule, signing the employee's timeslip, and having the temporary
employee report to an on-site supervisor as controlling the means of work. Such
things as on-site interviewing and training were viewed as controlling the
manner of performance.5
c. Other Applicable Standards
The economic realities test and the Amarnare/Magnuson test are the only
specific tests that have been applied by courts in temporary employment cases.

discussed later in this article.
48. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 504-05.
49. Id. at 507.
50. Id. at 508-09. The Anarnare court based its analysis on the employer's "right to control"
and on the shared servant doctrine. See Amarnare, 611 F. Supp. at 348-49.
51. Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 508 (E.D. Va. 1992).
52. Id. at 508-10.
53. Id. at 508-09. See also Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 611 F.
Supp. 344, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
54. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 508-09.
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Several other standards, however, may be of use in analyzing the employeremployee relationship within the temporary employment context. In particular,
several other cases expanded the view of the Amarnare court with respect to the
necessary employer control of a temporary employee.
the D.C. Circuit
For example, in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson,
held that Title VII protected even those persons who were not in an employment
relationship with the party who discriminated against them. 6 Specifically, the
court read the terms "any individual" and "person aggrieved" in sections
703(a)(1)57 and 706(g)5" of Title VII to refer to "individuals who do not stand
in direct employment relationship with an employer.""'
In Bostick v. Rappleyea, 60 the district court held that not only employers,
but parties who control "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," are subject to liability under Title VII. 61 This language, and the
language of the Sibley Memorial decision, greatly lowered the standard for
liability to temporary employees under Title VII. If courts were to adopt these
standards, as opposed to the Amarnare criteria, almost all temporary employees
would be able to bring causes of action against their on-site employers.

III.

DOCTRINE OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT

The origins of the doctrine of joint employment are traceable to labor law.
This doctrine is normally applied in the context of determining who a party's
employer is for purpose of collective bargaining.' The doctrine is applied in
a similar fashion to cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).63 While
joint employment is not normally a doctrine associated with Title VII cases,
some fact scenarios involving temporary employees, their temp agencies, and
their on-site employers have required the courts to analyze the relationships in
the context of the employee having more than one employer.'

55. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
56. Id. at 1341. But see Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir.) (no employment
relationship exists if a "totality of the evidence" favors a finding that plaintiff was an independent
contractor), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (1994).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(A).
59. Sibley Mem'l Hosp., 488 F.2d at 1341.
60. 629 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
61. Id. at 1334.
62. See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1599 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-06 (1994).
64. Maynard, 626 F.2d at 361; Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.
1983).
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A. Joint Employment in Labor Cases
The Supreme Court has made two major rulings in the area of joint
employment. In Boire v. Greyhound Corp.,' the Court reversed both the
district court and the court of appeals in holding that the question of whether
or not joint employment exists was a question of fact rather than a question of
law. The Court held that the "indicia of control"' exercised by an employer
went beyond a simple judicial determination as to whether a joint employment
relationship existed.67
In Falk v. Brennan,' the Supreme Court interpreted the joint employment
doctrine with respect to the FLSA. The Court held that the definition of
employer under the FLSA was broad enough to allow for the possibility that a
worker had two employers.' Taken together, the holdings of these two cases
indicate that, under both the NLRA and the FLSA, an employee can have more
than one legal employer.
B. Tests for Determining Joint Employment
Courts employ two main tests to determine whether a joint employment
relationship exists. Some circuits accept the "mutual control" or "labor
relations" test based on the Boire and Falk decisions. Other circuits require
another element of that test to form what is called the "integration" test.
1. Mutual Control Test
In four circuits, the mutual control test is the standard used for determining
whether joint employment exists.7' This test is based on the joint control over
labor relations or working conditions of the employee. 7 The elements of this
test are best expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co.n
Wirtz was an NLRB case involving a trucking company that hauled exclusively

65. 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
66. Id. at 481.
67. Id.
68. 414 U.S. 190 (1973).
69. Id. at 195. The FLSA defines employer as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994).
70. See International House of Pancakes v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 906, 912-13 (2d Cir. 1982);
NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Jewell Smokeless
Coal Corp., 435 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (4th Cir. 1970); Ref-Chem Co. v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 131
(5th Cir. 1969).
71. NLRB v. Solid Waste Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Rivera-Vega
v. Conagra, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1350, 1369 (D.P.R. 1995).
72. 405 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1968).
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for a mining concern.'
In determining whether or not a joint employment
relationship existed, the Wirtz court asked five questions:
1) does the
employment take place on the premises of the company; 2) how much control
does the company exert over the employees; 3) does the company have the
power to fire, hire or modify the employment conditions of the employees; 4)
do the employees perform a "specialty job" within the production line; and 5)
may the employee refuse to work for the company?74
2. Integration Test
The integration test for joint employment requires that the employment
relationship not only meet the standards for the mutual control test, but also that
a certain degree of integration exist between the two employers.75 The federal
circuits that use the integration test use similar factors in applying the test,
although they apply these factors in slightly different ways.76
The test applied by the Sixth Circuit in Metropolitan Detroit Bricklayers
District Council v. J.E. Hoetger & Co.' analyzed four factors: first, the
interrelation between the two companies; second, whether or not the companies
had common management; third, the extent of centralization of labor relations;
and fourth, common ownership.78 However, the court concluded that these
were merely factors to be considered and not all of the criteria needed to be
present for joint employment to exist.79 In Davis v. NLRB, s° the Seventh
Circuit used the same factors in analyzing a joint employment situation. 8

73. Id. at 671.
74. Id. at 669-70. The Fifth Circuit applied the same standard when reviewing a joint
employment case under the FLSA. Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237-38 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
75. See Metropolitan Detroit Bricklayers Dist. Council v. J.E. Hoetger & Co., 672 F.2d 580,
584 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1271-73 (7th Cir. 1980); Pulitzer
Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1275, 1278-79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980); NLRB
v. Triumph Curing Ctr., 571 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1978); International Chem. Workers Union
v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 253, 257-58 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
76. International Chem. Workers, 561 F.2d at 257-58. But see Sakrete of N. California, Inc.
v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Davis, 617
F.2d at 1271-73.
77. 672 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 584.
79. Id.
80. 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980).
81. But see Lutheran Welfare Servs. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 777, 778 (7th Cir. 1979) (two or more
employers exercising significant control is sufficient to establish joint employment).
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The Ninth Circuit has applied a similar test, but its criteria differ slightly.
In NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center,' the Ninth Circuit relied on language
from a relatively obscure Supreme Court case in crafting its joint employer
analysis." Based on the decision in Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians
Local Union, Local 1264 v. Broadcast Service, Inc.,' in Triumph, the Ninth
Circuit held that while the four factors required for integration are valid, courts
should place more emphasis on three of the factors. The court held that while
centralized control, common management and the interrelation of the parties are
important elements of an integration analysis, based on Radio Union, the
element of common ownership is not as important.'
The Eighth Circuit test is also a slightly less onerous integration test. In
Industrial Personnel Corp. v. AERB,8 the court held that, beyond the mutual
control test, all that is necessary for integration is a "significant, functional"
relationship between the employers.8 7 Like the Ninth Circuit test, this analysis
of the employment relationship requires less of a link between the two
employers in order to establish a joint employee relationship.
C. Application of Joint Employer Analysis to Temporary Employment Cases
1. Mutual Control Test
The analysis of a temporary employment situation under the mutual control
test would attempt to answer the five questions asked in Wirtz in the context of
temporary employment.8 "
a. Location of Employment
In almost every case, a temporary employee will work at the on-site
employer's business location. This is an indication that an employer-employee
relationship exists. However, because most temporary employees do work onsite, the fact that this is a customary business practice makes this element less
definitive. Clearly, however, a temporary employee who works out of his or

82. 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
83. Id. at 468.
84. 380 U.S. 255 (1965). Radio Union is the only Supreme Court case in which the Court
discusses the concept of integration. In Radio Union, however, the Court requires integration in the
context of a "single employer" analysis as opposed to a "joint employer" analysis. Id. at 256.
Therefore, the Ninth Circiut may have interpreted Radio Union in a slightly different manner than
the Supreme Court intended.
85. Triumph Curing Cr., 571 F.2d at 468.
86. 657 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 229.
88. Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co, 405 F.2d 668, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1968).
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her home would have a more difficult time proving that a joint employment
relationship exists than would a temporary who works at the on-site employer's
location.
b. Control over Employee/Ability to Hire and Fire
In Browning-Ferris,the company hired independent truckers to haul loads
through a trucking "broker." The on-site employers had the ability to control
the daily activities of the contract employee. This, along with the on-site
employer's input into hiring and firing decisions, led the court to its finding that
both the on-site trucking company and the employment broker were
employers 89
On-site employers have the ultimate say as to whether or not a temporary
employee stays on the job. However, it is common for on-site employers to
make these decisions in consultation with temporary agencies.'
The more
input an on-site employer has, the greater is the likelihood that a joint
employment relationship will surrender this type of authority. An analysis that
is heavily weighed toward this element is likely to benefit potential plaintiffs.
c. Specialization of Job/Ability to Take Other Jobs
The jobs performed by temporary employees vary greatly. There are
temporary lawyers, engineers and accountants, as well as temporary laborers
and clerical workers. 9 The type of work performed by the temp will affect
the length and substance of a temp's relationship with an on-site employer and,
therefore, must be addressed.
The greater the skill level necessary to perform a job, the more complex
the particular project will be. This means that temporary assignments for
"professional" temps will often be longer in duration and require a greater
commitment on the part of the temporary worker. This commitment limits the
employee's ability to take other assignments. 2 The greater the commitment
to the on-site employer by the employee, the greater the possibility that this
relationship would rise to the level of an employer-employee relationship.

89. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119, 1123 (3d. Cir. 1982).
90. For a complete discussion of this process, see ROBERT E. PARKER, FLESH PEDDLERS AND
WARM BODIES: THE TEMPORARY HELP INDUSTRY AND ITS WORKERS 47-48, 90-92 (1994).
91. HENSON, supra note 3, at 3.
92. See Wirtz, 405 F.2d at 671-72 (discussing the role of independent contractors).
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2. Integration Test
The integration test in a temporary employment case would require the
plaintiff to prove the additional element of integration between the two
employers. This analysis does not translate well to the temporary employment
context, and this element would be very difficult for a plaintiff to prove in most
circumstances.
a. Sixth Circuit/Seventh Circuit Test
The integration test used by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits would be the
most difficult for a temporary employee plaintiff to satisfy. Few temporary
agencies have a relationship with their business customers that is close enough
to establish integration.93
It should be noted, however, that the elements of the integration test are
merely factors that a court is to consider rather than necessary elements. It may
be that, if the relationship between the temporary agency and the on-site
employer is extremely close in one area, a court in a temporary employment
case may decide that the plaintiff has satisfied the spirit of the integration test.'
b. Eighth Circuit/Ninth Circuit Tests
The Eighth Circuit integration test is probably the integration test that is
best suited for application to temporary employment cases. To establish
integration under the Industrial Personnel standard, the plaintiff need only
establish that a "significant, functional" relationship existed.95 In Industrial
Personnel, the Eighth Circuit held that such activities as having input on
working conditions and work rules was sufficient to establish such a
relationship.'
This standard would be much easier for a plaintiff to satisfy
than the standards used by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
The Ninth Circuit standard set forth in Triumph Curing Center would also
represent a lower burden for plaintiffs. The Triumph court stressed the
importance of common management and control of labor relations, and

93. An exception would be a company that opens a temporary agency as a subsidiary, then hires
all those workers for its business. By doing this, the company can avoid having to offer benefits
to the employees. Under this scenario, the level of interrelationship between the two companies
probably would be sufficient to satisfy the integration test.
94. This is one area where a court may less stringently adhere to the test as it is applied in labor
cases and adapt the test for use in temporary employment cases.
95. Industrial Personnel Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 226, 228 (8th Cir. 1981).
96. Id.
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downplayed the importance of common ownership.'
Again, if the court is
willing to adapt this test to better fit temporary employment cases, a plaintiff
would not be overly burdened by this test.
D. Synthesis of the Joint Employment Doctrine
Many of the labor law cases that apply the joint employment doctrine have
facts that are similar to temporary employment scenarios. In fact, many of the
concepts of this doctrine are similar to those applied in the temporary
employment cases that were discussed earlier. The joint employment doctrine
does not necessarily add anything new to the analysis of temporary employment
cases. Rather, it adds an established set of standards and a body of case law to
guide courts in this new and challenging area of employment law.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Temporary Employee
The temporary employee who suffers discrimination at the hands of an onsite employer has the same rights as any other worker. However, the temporary
employee must go an extra step to protect his or her rights against both the
temporary agency and the on-site employer.
In Magnuson, the court noted with approval the fact that the temporary
employee notified her supervisor of the on-site employer's activity.9
This
action reflected the plaintiff's perception as to whom her employer was at the
time of the discrimination. While Magnuson viewed the temporary agency as
her "legal" employer, she obviously viewed the on-site supervisor as an
employer as well.
To protect his or her rights, a temporary employee who has suffered
discrimination should report the situation to his or her temporary agency
immediately. Depending upon the managerial hierarchy of the on-site employer,
the temp may also want to inform someone in the on-site organization of the
discrimination. Unfortunately, given the status of a temporary employee, this
is a risky and highly unlikely scenario.'

97. NLRB v. Triumph Curing Ctr., 571 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1978).
98. Magnuson v. Peck Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Va. 1992).
99. The temporary employee typically is not accorded the same amount of attention and respect
that is given to permanent employees. PARKER, supra note 90, at 120.
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Robert Parker relays the story of a black temporary employee who was
treated poorly by what he referred to as a "bigoted employer." " ° In this
situation, the employee walked off the job rather than deal with the abuse.
Presumably, the employee did this without notifying the temporary agency or
the on-site employer about the supervisor's actions.' O'
In a situation like this, neither the temporary agency nor the on-site
employer would incur liability, as neither had notice that the behavior
occurred.1° Obviously, the offended employee felt that, if he said anything
to the on-site employer, his temporary job would be jeopardized and that
neither his temporary agency nor his on-site employer would assist him.
Unfortunately, this situation is far too common. Nonetheless, the employee
must take the affirmative step of at least notifying the temporary agency to
protect his or her rights.
B. The Temporary Agency
In most situations, the temporary agency will be an employer for the
purposes of Title VII.'3 The agency might think that, because its employees
have not committed the harassment, the agency is off the hook. In these
situations, the "easy way out" for the temp agency would be to ignore the
actions of the on-site employer. As the client of the temporary agency, the onsite employer may not be happy when the agency contacts them with information
about a permanent employee harassing a temp.
It is vital, however, that the temporary agency do something to remedy the
situation once it is discovered. While bringing this situation to the attention of
the on-site employer may upset the employer, t" the Magnuson court made it
clear that a failure to act by the temporary agency will lead to liability on the
part of the agency. 1
C. The On-Site Employer
When a temporary employee accuses a permanent co-worker of
discrimination, the on-site employer is faced with a choice. The employer can
assume that it is not the employer of the temporary employee and suggest that

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
attention.
105.

Id. at 119.
Id.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 508.
Conversely, the on-site employer may be pleased that this information was brought to its
Magnuson v. Peck Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 506, 508 (E.D. Va. 1992).
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the employee contact the temporary agency, or the employer can investigate the
allegations. Smart on-site employers will choose the latter, even if this means
investigating the actions of valued employees.
In Temporary Employees: What Are an Employer's EEO Responsibilities?,
L. Lynne Pulliam sets forth some guidelines to help on-site employers
understand their liability under Title VII.' ° These suggestions include: (1)
selecting the agency "carefully"; (2) evaluating how the agency controls the
work of the temporaries; (3) not interfering with a temp's employment
opportunities with other employers; (4) examining job classifications that are
comprised mostly of temps for potential adverse impact; and (5) establishing
written policies in a neutral manner." 7 While, in principle, these suggestions
are helpful, in reality, it may be as difficult for an on-site employer to avoid
these situations with temporary employees as it is to avoid these situations with
permanent employees. Certainly, an on-site employer should do all it can to
avoid situations that could lead to potential liability. It is just as important,
however, to have a plan in place to deal with a case of discrimination when it
arises.
There are three reasons not to ignore the claims of a temporary employee.
First, ignoring such information is a gamble. Based on Amarnare and
Magnuson, there is a good chance that the on-site employer will be subject to
liability as an employer under Title VII. Second, the permanent employee may
not have limited his or her behavior to the temp employee. By exposing this
behavior now, the on-site employer may prevent similar incidents in the future.
Finally, by forcefully addressing an incident like this, the employer notifies all
of its employees that such behavior will not be tolerated. While taking action
against a permanent employee may be painful, acting now will limit liability in
both the present case and perhaps in future cases as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of temporary employees is greatly increasing in the American
workplace. While these relationships are typically beneficial to all involved,
when something goes wrong, the parties may be confused as to where
responsibility lies. Because widespread temporary employment is a fairly recent
phenomenon, many of these questions have not yet reached the courts.

106. Pulliam, supra note 39, at 537.
107. Id. Pulliam's suggestions regarding the creation of written policies and the review of job
classifications are excellent. However, suggestions to choose your agency carefully, or to evaluate
the amount of control an agency exercises, seem inefficient and impractical.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [1997], Art. 1

18

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The cases that have reached the courts provide some guidance as to how
situations involving temporary employees should be handled. Based on NLRA
cases and the joint employment doctrine, courts hearing cases involving
temporary employment issues are likely to gauge an on-site employer's liability
based on the employer's extent of control over the employee.'0 8
Each of these doctrines requires an intensive factual analysis. While it is
clear that both temporary agencies and on-site employers can be liable for
discrimination suffered by temporary employees, the question of whether or not
they will be liable, as well as the extent of the liability, will vary from case to
case.
Finally, the doctrines set forth by the Amarnare and Magnuson courts are
very similar to the joint employment doctrine. In fact, the Magnuson court, in
a footnote, acknowledged that it felt that the joint employment doctrine
Hopefully, in the years to come, courts will
supported its holding. "
synthesize these doctrines into a test that will provide guidance to temporary
employees, temporary agencies, and on-site employers.

108. According to the Magnuson court, in analyzing the relationship between the parties in a
temporary employment relationship, the most important factor is "the employer's right to control
the manner and means of worker performance." Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 510.
109. Id. at 509 & n.4.
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